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This contribution assesses the consensus-based analysis and
reasoning of the European Court of Human Rights in recent
judgments concerning equal marriage rights and compares it
to the Court’s past jurisprudence on European consensus
and the margin of appreciation awarded to Member States
regarding the issue of equal marriage rights. The contribu-
tion aims to analyse whether there is a parallel to be seen
between the rapid global trend of legalisation of same-sex
marriage and the development or evolution of the case law
of the ECtHR on the same topic. Furthermore, it demon-
strates that the Court’s consensus-based analysis is prob-
lematic for several reasons and provides possible alternative
approaches to the balancing of the Court between, on the
one hand, protecting rights of minorities (in this case same-
sex couples invoking equal marriage rights) under the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights and, on the other hand,
maintaining its credibility, authority and legitimacy towards
Member States that might disapprove of the evolving case
law in the context of same-sex relationships. It also offers
insights as to the future of European consensus in the con-
text of equal marriage rights and ends with some conclud-
ing remarks.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Historical Developments Concerning Same-
Sex Relationships
Same-sex couples have long sought access to civil
unions1 and marriage in several countries within and
outside of Europe.2 Many of these challenges were with
a view to have the (heteronormative) legislation changed
in favour of same-sex couples. Denmark was the first
country in the world in 1989 to offer the possibility of
civil unions to same-sex couples.3 The Netherlands
made history in 2001 when it was the first country in the
world to legalise same-sex marriage.4 Other countries
such as Belgium,5 Spain,6 Canada7 and South Africa8
followed suit. More than twenty countries in the world
now offer the possibility of marriage to same-sex cou-
1. The term ‘civil unions’ will be used as the generally accepted generic
term for various same-sex unions such as registered partnerships, life
partnerships, domestic partnerships, civil partnerships and anything oth-
er than same-sex marriage and cohabitation by same-sex couples.
2. P. Johnson, Homosexuality and the European Court of Human Rights
(2013), at 147.
3. The Danish Registered Partnership Act, 1 June 1989, D/341 H ML Act
No. 372.
4. N.G. Maxwell, ‘Opening Civil Marriage to Same-Gender Couples: A
Netherlands-United States Comparison’, 18 Arizona Journal of Interna-
tional and Comparative Law, at 141-57 (2001).
5. A. Fiorini, ‘New Belgium Law on Same-sex Marriage and Its PIL Implica-
tions’, 52 The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 4, at
1039-49 (2003).
6. R. Platero, ‘Love and the State: Gay Marriage in Spain’, 3 Feminist
Legal Studies 15, at 329-40 (2007).
7. C. Cortina et al., ‘Same-Sex Marriages and Partnerships in Two Pioneer
Countries, Canada and Spain’, 27th IUSSP International Population
Conference, Busan (2013).
8. C. Mubangizi and B.K. Twinomugisga, ‘Protecting the Right of Freedom
of Sexual Orientation: What Can Uganda Learn from South Africa?’, 22
Stellenbosch Law Review 330, at 330-51 (2011).
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ples and more than thirty the possibility of civil unions.9
Fourteen of the States (and territories) that have legal-
ised same-sex marriage are Member States of the Coun-
cil of Europe (‘CoE’ from this point on), while two oth-
er Member States, Malta and Germany, recently voted
positively in their parliaments to legalise same-sex mar-
riage and whose laws will come into force at the end of
the year. Despite these developments in legislation,
many international courts have been and still are hesi-
tant to develop their jurisprudence dealing with same-
sex relationships because of the sensitive nature of the
topic. As a result of this, there is hardly any evolution in
the case law. The same can be said for the European
Court of Human Rights (hereinafter ‘the ECtHR’ or
‘the Court’).
This contribution assesses the consensus-based analysis
and reasoning of the ECtHR in the judgments Hämäläi-
nen, Oliari and Others, and Chapin and Charpentier in
Section 2 and aims to fill the gap in existing literature by
comparing it to the Court’s past jurisprudence on Euro-
pean consensus and the margin of appreciation awarded
to Member States regarding the issue of equal marriage
rights. The consensus-based analysis of the ECtHR in
such cases consists of looking for the existence of rights-
enhancing practices and policies amongst the Member
States that affect human rights.10 When these practices
achieve a certain measure of uniformity, also known as
‘European consensus’, the Court then raises the stand-
ard of rights protection to which all Member States
must adhere. This entails that the Court first looks for
consensus amongst the Member States in order to
oblige other States to follow similar practices. The three
judgments have specifically been chosen as these are the
most recent cases in the last five years on these topics
(European consensus, margin of appreciation and equal
marriage rights) and this contribution aims to investi-
9. Same-sex marriage is legal in Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Canada,
Colombia, Denmark, Finland, France, Greenland, Iceland, Ireland, Lux-
embourg, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Slovenia,
South-Africa, Spain, Sweden, The United States and Uruguay. In addi-
tion, same-sex marriages performed within Mexico are recognised by all
31 of its states without exception, while legislation to change the laws is
officially pending in several states. A similar situation is applicable to
The United Kingdom, as Northern Ireland is the only part of The United
Kingdom where same-sex marriage is not legalised, whereas England,
Wales and Scotland allow it. Recently, the High Court of Northern Ire-
land even rejected petitions from applicants who wanted to marry or
have a legally solemnised marriage in England recognised in Northern
Ireland, see In Re X, 17 August 2017. Australia is holding a postal sur-
vey in the fall of 2017 to have the population vote on same-sex mar-
riage. The results will be non-binding, but may help to convince the
parliament to vote positively whenever a new bill to change the mar-
riage laws is submitted. As mentioned previously, Malta and Germany
recently passed same-sex marriage laws in parliament. For more infor-
mation, see <http:// news. trust. org/ item/ 20170301175104 -eik56/>
and <https:// www. britannica. com/ topic/ same -sex -marriage>. For a full
overview, see the LawsAndFamilies Database which was recently
launched and covers 60 legal aspects of marriage, partnership and
cohabitation over the last 50 years of same-sex and different-sex cou-
ples in more than twenty countries, available at: <https:// www.
lawsandfamilies. eu/>.
10. L.R. Helfer, ‘Consensus, Coherence and the European Convention on
Human Rights’, 26 Cornell International Law Journal 133, at 134-65,
139-40 (1993).
gate whether there is a parallel to be seen between the
rapid global trend of legalisation of same-sex marriage
and the case law of the ECtHR on the same topic.
In Section 3, this contribution analyses whether or not
there is visible evolution in the reasoning of the Court
on equal marriage rights, demonstrates that the
ECtHR’s consensus-based analysis is problematic for
several reasons and provides possible alternative
approaches to the balancing of the Court between, on
the one hand, protecting rights of minorities (in this
case, same-sex couples) under the European Convention
on Human Rights (‘ECHR’ or ‘the Convention’ from
here on further)11 and, on the other hand, maintaining
its credibility, authority and legitimacy towards Mem-
ber States that might disapprove of the evolving case
law in the context of same-sex relationships. It also
offers insights as to the future of European consensus on
equal marriage rights and ends with some concluding
remarks.
1.2 Article 12 ECHR and the Right to Marry and
to Found a Family
Applicants dealing with equal marriage rights have chal-
lenged different provisions of the ECHR before the
ECtHR. Mainly Articles 8 (the right to respect for pri-
vate and family life), 12 (the right to marry and to found
a family) and 14 ECHR (the prohibition of discrimina-
tion) have been invoked. In the context of this contribu-
tion, the most relevant provision is Article 12, which is
as follows:
Men and women of marriageable age have the right
to marry and to found a family, according to the
national laws governing the exercise of this right.
There is a noticeable difference between Article 12 and
other provisions in the Convention. Namely, Article 12
refers to ‘men and women’ while other ECHR provi-
sions speak of ‘everyone’ (for instance Arts. 1, 2, 5, 6, 8,
9, 10, 11 and 13) or ‘no one’ (Arts. 3, 4 and 7). This dif-
ferentiation in Article 12 is probably due to the fact that
the provision is based on12 and inspired by13 Article 16
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(‘UDHR’),14 which contains a similar provision. Article
12 ECHR can lend itself to different interpretations.15
One interpretation is that Article 16 UDHR, when read
in light of Article 2 UDHR, which contains a general
prohibition on discrimination, grants the right to marry
to everyone under the UDHR.16 Similarly, Article 1
ECHR grants rights to everyone in the jurisdiction of
the CoE Member States; Article 12 read in combination
11. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, 4 November 1950, ETS No. 005.
12. K. Waaldijk, ‘Vijftien jaar openstelling huwelijk: Naar een huwelijksrecht
ongeacht gerichtheid en geslacht’, Ars Aequi, 237-46, at 240 (2016).
13. B. Van der Sloot, ‘Between Fact and Fiction: An Analysis of the Case
Law on Article 12 ECHR’, 26 Child and Family Law 1-24, at 2 (2014).
14. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, General
Assembly resolution 217 A.
15. Van der Sloot, above n. 13, at 2.
16. Ibid., at 4.
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with Article 1 ECHR could therefore be interpreted as
encompassing persons of the same sex. The other inter-
pretation is that, since Article 12 ECHR only speaks of
‘men’ and ‘women’, the rights under it for marriage are
confined to persons of the opposite sex. This latter
interpretation is the one that the ECtHR has embraced
and that came to light in numerous cases which will be
discussed in the first part of the next section.
2 The ECtHR’s Consensus-
Based Analysis on Equal
Marriage Rights
2.1 The Court’s Heteronormative Approach to
Article 12 ECHR in Established Judgments
One of the first cases in which the Court elaborated on
Article 12 ECHR was Rees.17 The ECtHR was of the
opinion that the right envisioned in Article 12 refers to
the traditional marriage between persons of the opposite
sex and that the provision serves to protect marriage as
the basis of the family.18 The most extensive discussion
of this matter by the ECtHR took place in the case of
Schalk and Kopf; a same-sex couple in Austria invoked
Article 12 because they wanted to marry and the State
did not allow them to do so.19 The Court indicated that
the chosen wording of Article 12 ‘must be regarded as
deliberate and regard must be had to the historical con-
text in which the Convention was adopted. In the 1950s,
marriage was clearly understood in the traditional sense
of being a union between partners of different sex’.20
This historical or teleological interpretation of the Con-
vention is contradictory to the Court’s own case law;
more on this in Section 3 of this contribution. The
applicants were of the opinion that the provision should
be interpreted as to current conditions and the society
we live in today and that same-sex couples should also
be able to enjoy rights under it.21 The ECtHR acknowl-
edged that the institution of marriage had undergone
major social changes since the adoption of the Conven-
tion, but concluded that there was no European consen-
sus on same-sex marriage. The most notable aspect of
the case was that the Court took into consideration Arti-
cle 9 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Euro-
pean Union (which makes no reference to ‘men’ or
‘women’)22 and no longer considered the right to marry
under Article 12 ECHR in all circumstances to be limited
to marriage between persons of the opposite sex.23
Unfortunately, the Court did not elaborate on what
17. Rees v. The United Kingdom, ECHR (1986), No. 9532/81.
18. Ibid., para. 49.
19. Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, ECHR (2010), No. 30141/04.
20. Ibid., para. 55.
21. Ibid., para. 57.
22. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 26/10/2002,
C 326/391. Art. 9 of the Charter states that the right to marry and the
right to found a family shall be guaranteed in accordance with the
national laws governing the exercise of these rights.
23. Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, above n. 19, para. 61 (emphasis added).
these circumstances could be. However, the statement
of the Court can be seen as an opening for a different
view in the future, which is a good development for
equal marriage rights. Even so, in the case at hand, the
Court found that national authorities are the ones that
are best placed to assess and respond to the needs of
society24 and concluded that Article 12 ECHR does not
impose an obligation on the contracting States to grant
same-sex couples access to marriage.25 Thus, the matter
is left to the States to act within their margin of appreci-
ation. As explained in Section 3, this can lead to a dete-
rioration in the treatment of minorities.
It can be said that up through Schalk and Kopf, the
Court had followed a heteronormative approach to cases
dealing with questions on same-sex marriage. Johnson
calls it a ‘strong heteronormative conceptualisation of
marriage’,26 meaning that the focus of the concept is on
heterosexual persons of the opposite sex and that same-
sex couples are denied any rights that are linked to it.
Interestingly enough, this heteronormative interpreta-
tion of the Court came to light mostly in cases concern-
ing the rights of transsexuals and not homosexuals
themselves. These cases led the ECtHR to express itself
also on same-sex relationships on the basis that some of
the transitions of the applicants led or could lead to
them being in a relationship with a person of the same
(acquired) sex. One of these cases was C and L.M.27
where the Court expressed that there was no right for
the couple at issue, a (female) transsexual in a relation-
ship with her lesbian partner, to marry and found a fam-
ily under Article 12 as the case concerned a same-sex
couple.28 This line of thinking was continued in Cossey
v. The United Kingdom.29 Applicant Cossey had been
registered at birth as a man and had later in life transi-
tioned to a woman. She wanted to marry an Italian man,
but couldn’t as she herself was biologically not consid-
ered a man. According to the ECtHR, attachment to the
traditional concept of marriage justified the use of bio-
logical criteria for determining a person’s sex for the
purposes of marriage.30 The fact that post-operative
transsexuals were experiencing problems when trying to
enjoy or invoke their marriage rights was apparently not
enough reason for the Court to abandon this. It wasn’t
until the Christine Goodwin v. The United Kingdom case
that the ECtHR sought a new approach.31 The case con-
cerned a transsexual, born a male and later transitioned
to a female, that suffered distress due to the fact that the
government had not taken any constructive steps to
address the issues experienced by the applicant and oth-
er post-operative transsexuals. The lack of legal recogni-
tion of her changed gender had been the cause of
24. Ibid., para. 62.
25. Ibid., paras. 58 and 101.
26. Johnson, above n. 2, at 150.
27. C. and L.M. v. The United Kingdom, ECHR (1989), No. 14753/89.
28. Ibid., para. 3.
29. Cossey v. The United Kingdom, ECHR (1990), No. 10843/84.
30. Ibid., para. 46 (emphasis added).
31. Christine Goodwin v. The United Kingdom, ECHR (2002), No.
28957/95.
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numerous discriminatory and humiliating experiences
in her everyday life.32 The Court acknowledged that
there had been major social changes in the institution of
marriage since the adoption of the ECHR as well as dra-
matic changes resulting from developments in medicine
and science in the field of transsexuality. It therefore
found that a test of congruent biological factors could no
longer be decisive in denying legal recognition of trans-
sexuals, but attention needed also to be given to the
social role of the assigned gender.33 This meant that
Article 12 could now finally be understood as to include
men and women that were post-operative transsexuals.
There have been more cases since Goodwin that dealt
with transsexuals and equal marriage rights,34 but Good-
win can specifically be considered a breakthrough for
transsexuals seeking to gain legal rights and recognition
of their acquired sex. Unfortunately, this did not entail
that same-sex couples could now derive any rights as the
ECtHR emphasised that the applicant lived as a woman,
was in a relationship with a man and would only wish to
marry a man; in other words, this was a heterosexual
couple.35
The issue of equal marriage rights and same-sex rela-
tionships continued to also be raised in cases concerning
civil unions and its characteristics. One of such cases
was Burden v. The United Kingdom.36 The case involved
two unmarried sisters that had lived together for more
than thirty years in a house inherited by their parents.
The sisters were concerned that when one of them
would die, the other would be forced to sell the house to
pay inheritance tax, while spouses or ‘civil partners’
were exempt from charge. The ECtHR expressed that a
relationship between siblings or other people in cohabi-
tation is (legally) different from that between married
couples and homosexual civil partners.37 Rather than
the length or the supportive nature of the relationship,
what is determinative is the existence of a public under-
taking, carrying with it a body of rights and obligations
of a contractual nature. The Court made it clear that
there was no analogy between married and civil partner-
ship couples on the one hand and different-sex or same-
sex couples who choose to live together, but not become
husband and wife or civil partners on the other hand.38
This statement was interesting as it was made without
the distinction in the sex of the persons in the marriage
or civil union. The ECtHR went a little further in Val-
lianatos and Others v. Greece and expressed the equality
between different-sex and same-sex couples in relation
to civil unions.39 Greece had introduced a law that
allowed only different-sex couples to enter into civil
32. Ibid., paras. 60-63.
33. Ibid., para. 100 (emphasis added).
34. For a complete overview, see the ECtHR’s Fact Sheet on Gender Identi-
ty Issues of April 2017, available at: <http:// echr. coe. int/ Documents/
FS_ Gender_ identity_ ENG. pdf>.
35. Christine Goodwin v. The United Kingdom, above n. 31, para. 101.
36. Burden v. The United Kingdom, ECHR (2008), No. 13378/05.
37. Ibid., para. 62.
38. Ibid., para. 65.
39. Vallianatos and Others v. Greece, ECHR (2013) Nos. 29381/09 and
32684/09.
unions. The applicants claimed this infringed their right
to respect for their private and family life (Art. 8) and
amounted to unjustified discrimination (Art. 14)
between different-sex and same-sex couples, to the det-
riment of the latter. The ECtHR reiterated Schalk and
Kopf to the fact that same-sex couples are comparable to
different-sex couples as regards their need for legal rec-
ognition and protection of their relationship.40 The
Court found that by excluding same-sex couples from
its scope, the law in question introduced a difference in
treatment based on the sexual orientation of the persons
concerned, which is not allowed.41 The ECtHR made its
point even stronger by stating that civil partnerships as
an officially recognised alternative to marriage have an
intrinsic value for the applicants and would provide for
legal recognition by the State.42 The same can be said
for same-sex couples in general as well of course in sit-
uations where they cannot marry; however, that was not
the issue in this case. The law at issue was meant to pro-
vide a new form of non-marital partnership in Greece;
for same-sex couples this would mean the sole basis in
Greek law to have the relationship legally recognised.
This trend was one that the ECtHR had noticed also
elsewhere in Europe. It pointed out that although there
was no consensus among the Member States, a trend was
emerging with regard to the introduction of forms of
legal recognition of same-sex relationships.43 Nineteen
States had thus far authorised some form of registered
partnership other than marriage; Lithuania and Greece
were the only ones at that time to reserve it exclusively
for different-sex couples.44 The Court found that the
Greek government had not offered convincing and
weighty reasons capable of justifying the exclusion of
same-sex couples from the scope of the domestic law,
resulting in discrimination. Consequently, the ECtHR
concluded that there had been a violation of Article 14
taken in conjunction with Article 8 ECHR. As a conse-
quence of the case, Greece introduced civil unions for
same-sex couples in December of 2015 and further-
more, a year later the Greek parliament passed a bill for
the abolition of discrimination based on sexual orienta-
tion.45 The judgment in Vallianatos was a breath of
fresh air, but it did not encourage equal marriage rights.
The ECtHR’s heteronormative approach to equal mar-
riage rights is sometimes elaborated on in the concur-
ring opinions. For instance, in Burden v. The United
Kingdom, judge Björgvinsson46 concluded that the insti-
tution of marriage was closely linked to the idea of the
family, consisting of a man and a woman and their chil-
dren, as one of the cornerstones of the social structure in
40. Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, above n. 19, para. 99.
41. Vallianatos and Others v. Greece, above n. 39, para. 79.
42. Ibid., para. 81.
43. Ibid., para. 91 (emphasis added).
44. Ibid.
45. M. Kowalski, ‘Civil Partnerships in Greece, A Year Later’, available at:
<https:// medium. com/ athenslivegr/ civil -partnership -in -greece -a -year -
later -d1f571ac1ab0> (last accessed on 15 September 2017). Lithuania
unfortunately does not provide same-sex couples the possibility to con-
clude civil unions.
46. Johnson, above n. 2, at 150.
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the UK, as well as in other States of the CoE. Björgvins-
son felt that extending these rights to same-sex couples
could potentially have important and far-reaching social
and legal consequences in those States.47 This argument
is quite odd, as this was not the case in many States at
the time of Burden that did allow same-sex marriage or
had just introduced it.48 Björgvinsson continued that it
was not the role of the ECtHR to take the initiative in
this matter and impose upon Member States a duty to
extend the applicability of these rules without, accord-
ing to him, a clear view of the consequences that it may
have. In his view, it must fall within the margin of
appreciation of the respondent State to decide when and
to what extent this will be done.49 Judges Malinverni
and Kovler in their concurring opinion in Schalk and
Kopf50 took it a step further by stating that Article 12
ECHR is not applicable to same-sex couples at all.
According to them, the literal interpretation of the pro-
vision represents the ‘general rule of interpretation’ in
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (‘The
Vienna Convention’)51 and thus precludes the provision
from being construed as conferring the right to marry
on persons of the same sex. However, an overwhelming
majority of authors in general share the view that an
evolutive interpretation of the ECHR by the ECtHR is
allowed by the general rule of interpretation in the Vien-
na Convention.52 Dzehtsiarou is of the opinion that the
ECHR should be an instrument of development and
improvement rather than an ‘end game’ treaty, which
froze the state of affairs that existed sixty years ago;53 I
agree with this line of thinking; originalism, the intent
of the contracting parties with regard to specific treaty
provisions, plays a very limited role with regard to
human rights treaties.54 Pitea even finds it difficult to
argue that an evolutive interpretation as such is at odds
with the Vienna Convention.55
47. Concurring opinion of judge Björgvinsson in Burden v. The United
Kingdom, above n. 36.
48. We can also draw a similarity with the case of Oliari (discussed in Sec-
tion 2.2.2 of this contribution) where the Court, in the Italian situation
of a lack of recognition and protection of same-sex unions, stated that
it would not amount to any particular burden on the Italian State be it
legislative, administrative or other to provide recognition and protection
of same-sex couples. See Oliari and Others v. Italy, ECHR (2015), Nos.
18766/11 and 36030/11, para. 173.
49. Concurring opinion of judge Björgvinsson in Burden v. The United
Kingdom, above n. 36.
50. Concurring opinion of judge Malinverni joined by judge Kovler in Schalk
and Kopf v. Austria, above n. 19.
51. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, United
Nations, Treaty Series, 1155, 331.
52. C. Pitea, ‘Interpreting the ECHR in the Light of “Other” International
Instruments: Systemic Integration or Fragmentation of Rules on Treaty
Interpretation?’, in N. Boschiero et al. (eds), International Courts and
the Development of International Law: Essays in Honor of Prof. Tullio
Treves (2013) 545, at 553.
53. K. Dzehtsiarou, ‘European Consensus and The Evolutive Interpretation
of the European Convention on Human Rights’, 12 German Law Jour-
nal 1730, at 1730-45 (2011).
54. G. Letsas, A theory of interpretation of the ECHR (2007), at 59. Also
see M. Killander, ‘Interpreting regional human rights treaties’, 7 SUR
International Journal on Human Rights 13, para. 2.2 (2010). See Sec-
tion 3 of this contribution for more information on this argument.
55. Ibid.
In the same judgment, there was also a joint dissenting
opinion of judges Rozakis, Spielmann and Jebens.56
These judges did not agree with the majority that there
had been no violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction
with Article 8 ECHR and stressed that because Austria
did not advance any argument to justify the difference
of treatment, there should be no room for the ECtHR to
apply the margin of appreciation. According to them,
only when a State offers grounds for justification can
the ECtHR be satisfied, taking into account the pres-
ence or the absence of a common approach that States
are better placed than the Court is to deal effectively
with the matter.57 In addition, the judges found that any
absence of a legal framework offering same-sex couples
the same rights or benefits attached to marriage would
need robust justification, especially taking into account
the growing trend in Europe to offer some means of
qualifying for such rights or benefits. I agree with this
view; it would also provide more consistency in the
Court’s assessment of the application of justifications
and the proportionality principle, as well as enhance
legal certainty not only for applicants, but also for any-
one wanting to analyse and understand the Court’s rea-
soning. A similar argument in favour of equal marriage
rights was given by Mr Schermers in W. v. The United
Kingdom.58 He found that the fundamental human right
underlying Article 12 ECHR should also be granted to
same-sex couples, even though that was not the issue in
that case. He was of the opinion that the right to marry
and to found a family is of paramount importance for
the individual and denial of this right would mean con-
demnation to solitude and loneliness. Schermers advo-
cates that there must be strong arguments to justify
such condemnation. He also discusses the principle of
proportionality and the point often made that public
order would be disturbed if persons of the same sex
could found a family, but doubts whether that is a valid
argument because it would be unacceptable discrimina-
tion if only those who are able to procreate had the right
to family life. Schermers finds very little on that side of
the scale to justify the discrimination against the indi-
vidual interest of same-sex couples. This is similar to
the views of judges Rozakis, Spielmann and Jebens in
Schalk and Kopf concerning Article 14 ECHR and the
robust justifications needed.
Despite the occasional dissenting opinion in favour of
equal marriage rights, the main view of the ECtHR is
still that of the heteronormative approach. In the next
subsections, the three most recent cases dealing with
equal marriage rights and the Court’s consensus-based
analysis therein are discussed.
56. Joint dissenting opinion of judges Rozakis, Spielmann & Jebens, in
Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, above n. 19; also see para. 80 of the judg-
ment itself.
57. Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, above n. 19, para. 98.
58. Dissenting opinion of judge Schermers in W. v. The United Kingdom,
ECHR (1989), No. 11095/84.
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2.2 The Court’s Heteronormative Approach to
Article 12 ECHR in Three Recent Judgments
2.2.1 Consensus-Based Analysis of the ECtHR in
Hämäläinen v. Finland59
As we saw in the previous paragraph of this contribu-
tion, cases dealing with transsexuals sometimes relate to
the topic of equal marriage rights. Hämäläinen is an
example of such a case involving a Finnish national born
male that transitioned later to a female. Prior to transi-
tion, the applicant had married a woman and had a child
together. After transition, the applicant wanted to have
her identity number changed into a female one, which
was refused by the local registry office. Confirmation of
such status required that the person was unmarried or
that the spouse gave their consent to have the marriage
changed into a registered partnership. Underlying this
odd rule was the fact that only a man and a woman
could marry under Finnish law. Understandingly, both
the applicant as well as the wife wished to remain mar-
ried to each other. However, this meant that the appli-
cant had no other means of registering herself as a
female. The applicant therefore instituted proceedings
at the local Court claiming that a divorce would be
against their religious convictions and a registered part-
nership did not provide the same security as marriage
meaning, among other things, that their child would be
placed in a different situation from children born within
wedlock. The Finnish Administrative Court as well as
the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s complaint.
An appeal was also denied, therefore the applicant
lodged an application to the ECtHR disputing a viola-
tion of her rights under Article 8 (the right to respect
for private and family life), Article 12 (the right to mar-
ry and to found a family) and Article 14 ECHR (the
prohibition of discrimination) for making the registering
of her gender conditional on the transformation of her
marriage into a registered partnership.
An interesting aspect of this case was that the Court
analysed it from the perspective of same-sex marriage
and not the practical difficulties (such as gender recog-
nition or a forced conversion of the marriage) that post-
operative transsexuals face after transition. The ECtHR
started its assessment by reiterating its standing in
Schalk and Kopf60 according to which Article 8 cannot
be interpreted as imposing an obligation on contracting
States to grant same-sex couples access to marriage. It
also referred to the Goodwin-case in its acknowledgment
that the regulation of the effects of gender-change in the
context of marriage falls to a large extent within the
margin of appreciation of the contracting State.61 At the
time of Hämäläinen, only ten Member States allowed
same-sex couples to marry. Exceptions allowing a mar-
ried person to gain legal recognition of the acquired
gender without having to end a pre-existing marriage
existed in only three Member States.62 The ECtHR
59. Hämäläinen v. Finland, ECHR (2014), No. 37359/09.
60. Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, above n. 19, para. 101.
61. Christine Goodwin v. The United Kingdom, above n. 31, para. 103.
62. Hämäläinen v. Finland, above n. 59, paras. 31-33.
thus concluded that there was no European consensus
on allowing same-sex marriages. Nor was there any con-
sensus in those States that do not allow same-sex mar-
riages as how to deal with gender recognition in the case
of a pre-existing marriage. The exceptions afforded to
married transsexuals were even fewer. According to the
Court, there had been no signs that the situation in the
Member States had changed significantly since it deliv-
ered its latest rulings on these issues.63 In the absence of
a European consensus and taking into account that the
case raised sensitive moral or ethical issues,64 the
ECtHR considered that the margin of appreciation to be
afforded to the State was a wide one.
Unfortunately, the ECtHR also did not uphold the
applicant’s complaint that the conversion of a marriage
into a registered partnership would be comparable to a
‘forced’ divorce, nor did it take into account the (sym-
bolic) or religious value that the marriage had for the
applicant and her wife. In the Court’s view, the differ-
ences between a marriage and a registered partnership
did not involve an essential change in the applicant’s
legal situation nor would the change of the marriage into
a civil partnership have any implications for the appli-
cant’s family life.65 The minor differences between the
two concepts did not mean that the Finnish system was
lacking with regard to the State’s positive obligation.66
Hence, the Court found the requirement of transforma-
tion of the marriage into a registered partnership not
disproportionate as the latter provided legal protection
to same-sex couples similar to marriage. The conclusion
therefore was that Article 8 had not been breached.67
The applicant did not initially invoke Article 12 in her
application to the ECtHR; however, the Chamber deci-
ded of its own motion to communicate the application
under this provision as well using this opportunity to
again emphasise its heteronormative interpretation of
the provision. The ECtHR in its assessment of the pro-
vision again referred to Rees, reiterating that Article 12
enshrines the traditional concept of marriage as being
between a man and a woman68 and repeated from Schalk
and Kopf that there is no obligation under this provision
for States to allow same-sex marriage.69 Furthermore,
considering that the consequences of the applicant’s
change of gender for the marriage between her and her
spouse had already been assessed under Article 8 and no
63. Ibid., paras. 73-74.
64. Ibid., para. 67. Also see X, Y and Z v. The United Kingdom, ECHR
(1997), No. 21830/93, para. 44.
65. According to the Court, the only changes it would cause would be for
the establishment of paternity, adoption outside of the family and the
family name, all of which were settled in the applicant’s case and there-
fore not at issue. Civil partnership would not affect the paternity of the
applicant’s daughter as it had already been validly established during
the marriage. Nor did the gender reassignment have any legal effects
on the responsibility for the care, custody, or maintenance of the child,
as responsibility in Finland was based on parenthood, irrespective of sex
or form of partnership. See Hämäläinen, above n. 59, paras. 83-86.
66. Ibid., para. 87.
67. Ibid., para. 89.
68. Rees, above n. 17, para. 49.
69. Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, above n. 19, para. 63 and Hämäläinen,
above n. 59, para. 96.
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violation was found, the ECtHR considered that no sep-
arate issue arose under Article 12.70 If that was the case,
then why communicate the application under this provi-
sion at all (if it was not invoked by the applicant in the
first place) other than to reiterate its heteronormative
approach to the provision?
With regard to Article 14 taken together with Articles 8
and 12, the ECtHR noted that Article 14 complements
the other substantive provisions of the ECHR and its
Protocols and has no independent existence; there can
be no room for its application unless the facts at issue
fall within the ambit of one or more of the latter (the
ECtHR had already established this in E.B. v. France
and in Vallianatos).71 Furthermore, in order for an issue
to arise under Article 14 there must be a difference in
treatment of persons in relevantly similar situations. But
when are situations ‘relevantly similar’? According to
the Court, the applicant’s situation, the situations of cis-
sexuals72 and unmarried transsexuals were not suffi-
ciently similar to be compared with each other. This
reasoning of the Court is rather a circular one; the rea-
son that the applicant’s situation is not comparable to
those of unmarried transsexuals and cissexuals is
because they are either not married and would not have
the problem of being ‘forced’ to change their marriage
into a registered partnership in the first place, or that
they have a heterosexual orientation or never transi-
tioned into another gender, meaning that they can mar-
ry (or remain married) without problems in almost all
situations. However, does the fact that there are no ‘oth-
er victims’ to compare the situation of the applicant to
mean that there is no discrimination suffered by the
applicant? The Court indeed concludes that it finds no
violation of Article 14 in conjunction with Articles 8 and
12.73 This conclusion does bring up the question of how
likely it is that Article 14 (in combination for instance
with Art. 8 and/or 12) could ever be applicable in situa-
tions where the invocation of equal marriage rights is
compared to situations of people that do not experience
discrimination (to the same extent).
2.2.2 Consensus-Based Analysis of the ECtHR in Oliari
and Others v. Italy74
Another recent case concerning equal marriage rights is
Oliari and Others v. Italy. The case involved three Ital-
ian same-sex couples that wanted to marry or enter into
another type of alternative union to marriage, but whose
marriage banns were refused on the ground that mar-
riage was only open to persons of the opposite sex and
were offered no alternatives to marriage. The couples’
challenges of the refusals were all rejected including Mr
Oliari and Mr A.’s subsequent appeal. All three couples
70. Hämäläinen, above n. 59, para. 97.
71. E.B. v. France, ECHR (2008), No. 43546/02, para. 47 and Vallianatos
and Others, above n. 39, para. 72.
72. Cissexuals or ‘cisgenders’ are people whose gender identity matches the
sex that they were assigned to at birth. See <http:// advocate. com/
transgender/ 2015/ 07/ 31/ true -meaning -word -cisgender> for more
information.
73. Hämäläinen, above n. 59, paras. 112-3.
74. Oliari and Others v. Italy, above n. 48.
lodged an application to the ECtHR claiming that Ital-
ian legislation did not provide the possibility to marry or
enter into any other type of alternative union to mar-
riage and thus offered no legal means of recognition of
their relationship.75 The couples felt they were being
discriminated against on the basis of Article 8 and 12
alone, and in conjunction with Article 14.
The ECtHR stated that it would assess whether Italy
failed to comply with a positive obligation to ensure
respect for the applicants’ private and family life (Art.
8). What is so refreshing about this case is that the
Court found it important to emphasise the value legal
recognition has for same-sex couples and how the Italian
legislation was lacking in this case. The Court started its
analysis with a repetition of its views from Schalk and
Kopf and Vallianatos that same-sex couples are capable
of entering into stable committed relationships and that
they have a similar need for legal recognition and pro-
tection of their relationship.76 The Court took note that
the possibility of registering same-sex unions in Italy
had mere symbolic value and no official civil status.
Cohabitation agreements could also not be considered as
giving recognition and protection because they failed to
provide the core needs relevant to couples in stable
committed relationships.77 In addition, the law provided
for recognition of same-sex partners in very limited cir-
cumstances; even the most regular needs arising in the
context of a same-sex relationship needed to be deter-
mined judicially. The Court recognised that the con-
stant referral to domestic courts, especially in an over-
burdened justice system such as the one in Italy, would
amount to even more hindrance to applicants’ efforts to
obtain respect for their private and family life.78
Furthermore, there was a conflict between the social
reality of the three couples and the law, which did not
afford any official recognition of the relationship that
they openly had in Italy. The ECtHR was of the opinion
that providing recognition and protection of same-sex
unions would not amount to any particular legislative,
administrative or other burden on the Italian State.
Moreover, such legislation would serve an important
social need.79 According to the Court, in the absence of
marriage, same-sex couples have a particular interest in
entering into a form of civil union or registered partner-
ship to obtain relevant protection without necessary hin-
drance. The ECtHR found that such recognition has an
intrinsic value and would bring a sense of legitimacy to
75. Ibid., paras. 34, 39 and 42.
76. Ibid., para. 165, Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, above n. 19, para. 99 and
Vallianatos, above n. 39, paras. 78 and 81.
77. Cohabitation agreements are open to anyone cohabiting irrespective of
whether they are a couple in a stable relationship and they are also
dependent on cohabitation, while it has already been established that
the existence of a stable union is independent thereof, see Vallianatos,
above n. 39, paras. 49 and 73 and Oliari and Others v. Italy, above n.
48, paras. 168-170. Furthermore, it had not been proved that Italian
courts could issue a statement of formal recognition of such agree-
ments, nor what the implications of such a statement would be.
78. Oliari, above n. 48, para. 171.
79. The Court here referred to official statistics on the significant number of
persons of same-sex or bisexual orientation living in Italy, see para. 173.
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same-sex couples80; something similar expressed before
in Vallianatos.81 This line of reasoning of the Court is
fascinating as the same could also be said of same-sex
marriage and the value and meaning that has for same-
sex couples. Furthermore, in cases where same-sex cou-
ples invoke Article 12, there is also often a conflict
between the social reality of the applicants and the law,
which does not always afford them equal marriage
rights.
Continuing in Oliari, the ECtHR also found the rapid
movement towards legal recognition of same-sex cou-
ples in Europe relevant. At the time of Oliari, twenty-
four out of forty-seven CoE States already provided
some form of legal protection and recognition of same-
sex couples, whether it was same-sex marriage or a form
of registered partnership or civil union. The same rapid
development was to be seen globally to which the
ECtHR could not but attach some importance.82 The
Italian legislation unfortunately had not attached partic-
ular importance to the national community, the general
population and the highest judicial authorities in the
country, even though the Italian Constitutional Court
and the Court of Cassation had previously declared in a
series of cases the need for legal recognition of same-sex
unions.83 The ECtHR observed that the position of the
two Italian courts reflected the sentiments of a majority
of the Italian population; official surveys and statistics
indicated that there was a popular acceptance amongst
the Italian population of homosexual couples and the
support for their recognition and protection.84
The ECtHR established that the repetitive failure of
legislators potentially undermined the responsibilities of
the judiciary and left same-sex individuals in a situation
of legal uncertainty85; especially considering there was
no legitimate public interest or interests of the commun-
ity against which to balance the applicants’ interest. On
the contrary, the failure is capable of undermining the
credibility and authority of the judiciary and of jeopard-
ising its effectiveness, factors that are of the utmost
importance from the point of view of the fundamental
principles underlying the ECHR.86 The Court conclu-
ded that Italy had overstepped its margin of apprecia-
tion and failed to fulfil its positive obligation in provid-
ing a specific legal framework to ensure protection and
recognition for same-sex unions.87 For this reason, there
had been a violation of Article 8. However, the Court
considered it unnecessary to examine whether there had
also been a violation of Article 14 in conjunction with
80. Ibid., para. 174.
81. Vallianatos, above n. 39, para. 81.
82. Ibid., paras. 65, 135 and 178. The Court here makes a reference to dif-
ferent cases on same-sex marriage worldwide that were revolutionary,
in particular emphasising the ground-breaking Obergefell case before
the United States Supreme Court which legalised same-sex marriage in
all of the fifty States, see Obergefell v. Hodges, 26 June 2015, 576 US.
83. Oliari, above n. 48, para. 180.
84. Ibid., paras. 144 and 181.
85. Ibid., paras. 184-185.
86. Ibid., also see Broniowski v. Poland, ECHR (2004), No. 31443/96,
para. 175.
87. Oliari, above n. 48, para. 185.
Article 8. I think this is a missed opportunity as it would
have been interesting to see the Court’s analysis of Arti-
cle 14 on the topic of equal marriage rights.
With regard to Articles 12 and 14, we see the same het-
eronormative approach the Court has displayed before
in previous cases dealing with equal marriage rights.
The ECtHR noted that despite the gradual evolution of
States on the matter since Schalk and Kopf and Hämä-
läinen,88 the findings reached in those cases remained
pertinent. Only eleven CoE States had recognised same-
sex marriage thus far, hence the Court saw no reason to
conclude that Article 12 would impose an obligation on
Member States to also allow same-sex couples access to
marriage89; the same was concluded for Article 14 in
conjunction with Article 12. Both complaints under
those provisions were ill-founded and rejected by the
Court. A lost opportunity, as the Court could have tak-
en a more progressive approach here and for instance
applied an evolutive interpretation of Article 12. More
on this and a critical analysis of the ECtHR’s findings in
Section 3 of this contribution.
2.2.3 Consensus-Based Analysis of the ECtHR in Chapin
and Charpentier v. France90
The last recent case relating to equal marriage rights is
Chapin and Charpentier and concerns a French same-sex
couple wanting to marry. The marriage application was
rejected by the public prosecutor as only persons of dif-
ferent sex were able to marry, but the mayor of the
municipality decided to perform the marriage ceremony
anyway and registered the marriage entry in the local
civil registrar. The public prosecutor brought proceed-
ings against the couple, seeking to have the marriage
annulled, which succeeded. The couple appealed this
decision, but were denied. The Court of Cassation also
dismissed the couple’s application.
The applicants decided to lodge an application to the
ECtHR relying on Article 12 taken together with Article
14 contending that the limitation of marriage to differ-
ent-sex couples amounted to a discriminatory infringe-
ment of the right to marry. Furthermore, relying on
Article 8, the applicants felt they had been discrimina-
ted against on the basis of their sexual orientation. The
argumentation behind this was that if they had been a
different-sex couple, they would have several possibili-
ties of legal recognition of their relationship such as
cohabitation, the possibility of a civil union91 or mar-
riage. As a same-sex couple, there was only the possibili-
ty of cohabitation or a civil union, which in their eyes
provided less legal protection than marriage. Further-
more, they were of the opinion that the discrimination
did not pursue a legitimate goal (protecting the family)
and was therefore not proportionate.
It was no surprise that the Court again started its assess-
ment of Article 12 taken together with Article 14 from
88. Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, above n. 19, paras. 61-63 and Hämäläinen,
above n. 59, para. 96.
89. Oliari, above n. 48, para. 192.
90. Chapin and Charpentier v. France, ECHR (2016), No. 40183/07.
91. Civil unions in France are known as ‘pacte civil de solidarité’ or ‘PACS’.
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its heteronormative point of view. As always, the assess-
ment started with a reference to Schalk and Kopf. What
was encouraging was the acknowledgment that the insti-
tution of marriage had undergone major social changes
since the adoption of the ECHR, but the Court showed
no hesitation in declaring that there was no European
consensus on same-sex marriage.92 It accepted the appli-
cation of Article 1293 (unlike in Oliari) but went on to
repeat its statement from Hämäläinen that the provision
enshrined the traditional concept of marriage as being
between a man and a woman.94 One could ask to what
extent is it necessary to repeat this (heteronormative)
statement.95 The Court added that while some contract-
ing States have extended marriage to same-sex partners,
Article 12 could not be construed as imposing an obliga-
tion on the Member States to grant same-sex couples
access to marriage.96 Marriage has deeply rooted social
and cultural connotations that are likely to differ in each
State; therefore, the Court found that national authori-
ties are best to judge the needs of the society and
respond to it accordingly. In Oliari, the ECtHR went a
little further than it did in Hämäläinen by stating that
despite the gradual evolution of States on the matter (at
the time of Oliari, eleven CoE States recognised same-
sex marriage), the aforementioned findings on Article 12
(alone and in conjunction with Art. 14) remained perti-
nent.97 The ECtHR determined in the case at issue
(Chapin and Charpentier) that it could not conclude dif-
ferently given the short time that had elapsed since the
two judgments.98 This statement is peculiar, consider-
ing later on in the assessment, the ECtHR admitted that
this case was different than that of Oliari and that of
Vallianatos.99 In addition, the Court explained that sub-
sequent to the application of Chapin and Charpentier
being lodged, France had changed its laws in May of
2013 allowing same-sex couples access to marriage;
according to the ECtHR, the applicants were now free
to marry if they desired to. Consequently, this fact led
the ECtHR to conclude that there was no violation of
Article 12 in combination with Article 14. Again, a
remarkable conclusion. The question that comes to
mind is whether the Court would have been bolder
and/or gone further in its reasoning if France had not
yet allowed same-sex marriage; would it then have
found a violation of the provisions? Furthermore, the
Court’s argument can also be reversed; because France
had changed its laws in the meantime, one could also
interpret this as an admittance of a previous wrong prac-
92. Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, above n. 19, paras. 58-63.
93. Chapin and Charpentier, above n. 90, para. 36.
94. Hämäläinen, above n. 59, para. 96.
95. As we see in Section 3 of this contribution, it is the Court’s own case
law to consider the ECHR a living instrument and to apply an evolutive
or dynamic interpretation of the provisions of the ECHR. However, with
regard to same-sex marriage, the Court continues to remain conserva-
tive in its approach of the topic.
96. Chapin and Charpentier, above n. 90, para. 37 and Schalk and Kopf v.
Austria, above n. 19, para. 63.
97. Oliari, above n. 48, paras. 192-194.
98. The two judgments were delivered eleven months apart.
99. Chapin and Charpentier, above n. 90, para. 50.
tice. There are numerous cases where such a recent legal
change in legislation is actually held against the State
party.100
As for Article 8 taken together with Article 14, the
applicants had contended that they were victims in the
exercise of the right to respect for their private and fam-
ily life and that this amounted to discrimination based
on sexual orientation.101 The ECtHR was of the opinion
that States in this matter enjoyed a certain margin of
appreciation in deciding whether to grant same-sex cou-
ples access to marriage and as to the exact nature of the
status conferred by other forms of legal recognition.102
Although, at the material time marriage was not open to
French nationals under French law, the applicants could
have concluded a civil union (a PACS), which confers to
partners a number of rights and obligations in tax, patri-
monial and social matters.103 The fact that marriage has
a different value to the applicants and that, in their
view, a PACS provided less protection, was not relevant
to the Court. Accordingly, insofar as the applicants
pointed to the differences between marriage and civil
unions, the ECtHR stressed that it was not required to
give a ruling on each of these differences in detail,104 but
that these differences were generally consistent with the
trend observed in other Member States anyway and did
not discern any indication that France had exceeded its
margin of appreciation in the choice made of the rights
and obligations conferred by the civil union. What
strikes me is that the Court then again stressed the fact
that from 2013 on, France had provided same-sex cou-
ples the possibility to marry each other.105 That the
applicants could get married now does in my view not
change the fact that they felt they were being discrimi-
nated against at the time that they wanted to get mar-
ried; their marriage was even annulled. However, the
ECtHR consequently found no violation of Article 8
combined with Article 14.
100. J. Temperman for instance gives the example of Kuznetsov v. Ukraine,
ECHR (2003), No 39042/97 in ‘Freedom of religion or belief in prison:
A critical analysis of the European Court of Human Rights’ jurispru-
dence’, 6 Oxford Journal of Law and Religion 1, 1-45, at 7 (2017). An
example of a private party that also changed its rules or policy from a
previous wrong practice is Eweida and Others v. The United Kingdom,
ECHR (2013), Nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 and 36516/10.
101. The applicants contented that their differential treatment did not pursue
a legitimate goal (protecting the family), nor was it proportionate.
102. Chapin and Charpentier, above n. 90, para. 48, Schalk and Kopf v.
Austria, above n. 19, para. 108 and Gas and Dubois v. France, ECHR
(2012), No. 25951/07, para. 66.
103. Chapin and Charpentier, above n. 90, paras. 25 and 49.
104. Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, above n. 19, para. 109 and Chapin and
Charpentier, above n. 90, para. 51.
105. Chapin and Charpentier, above n. 90, para. 51.
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3 Critical Analysis of the
ECtHR’s Case Law on Equal
Marriage Rights
3.1 European Consensus on Same-Sex Marriage?
The biggest similarity in all three cases discussed is the
rationale of the ECtHR that Member States of the CoE
are under no obligation to grant same-sex couples access
to marriage, regardless of whether the applicants’ case is
based on Article 8 (right to respect for private and fami-
ly life) or Article 12 (right to marry) alone or either pro-
vision in combination with Article 14 ECHR (prohibi-
tion of discrimination). In Schalk and Kopf, the Court
found that the institution of marriage had undergone
major social changes, but that there was no European
consensus on same-sex marriage. In Hämäläinen, it went
further by not even willing to consider the case under
Article 12 and only reiterating its findings in Rees and
Schalk and Kopf. This approach was repeated in Oliari,
but even more strongly. The ECtHR did mention the
gradual evolution of States on the issue of same-sex
marriage, but found the outcomes reached previously in
Schalk and Kopf and Hämäläinen to remain pertinent.
Not only was Article 12 dismissed, but both the com-
plaint under Article 12 alone as well as in combination
with Article 14 were found to be manifestly ill-founded
and rejected.106 The ECtHR took it in Chapin and Char-
pentier again a step further by stating that Article 12 was
finally applicable, but unsurprisingly, it determined that
it could not conclude differently than it did in Oliari
given the short time that had elapsed since the two pre-
vious judgments and found no violation of Article 12 (in
combination with Art. 14). In all three cases, the
ECtHR referred to the number of States that had legal-
ised same-sex marriage and implied that because there
was no majority, there was no European consensus on
that topic. It then left the decision to the contracting
States themselves whether or not to grant same-sex cou-
ples access to marriage by pointing out that this topic
106. Oliari, above n. 48, para. 194.
falls within the States’ margin of appreciation.107 In
addition, the ECtHR acknowledged that the margin is
to be considered wide108 when the cases at hand raise
sensitive moral or ethical issues.109 All in all, we can
conclude that, unfortunately, there is hardly any evolu-
tion to be seen in the views of the ECtHR on equal mar-
riage rights in these recent judgments, despite the fact
that more and more Member States (as well as other
countries globally) are legalising same-sex marriage.
3.2 The ‘Problematic’ Consensus-Based Analysis
by the ECtHR
The consensus-based analysis by the ECtHR may prove
to be problematic for several reasons. First, offering a
wide margin of appreciation to States may lead to a dis-
criminatory treatment of minorities, considering that
States do not always have the best interest of minorities
in mind when dealing with sensitive moral or ethical
issues and trying to strike a balance between the public
interest and the interest of the individual. With the case
of same-sex marriage, certain States might choose pub-
lic or political interests over equal marriage rights. For
this reason, it would be better if the ECtHR would
apply a more assertive role in protecting and promoting
equal marriage rights instead of applying the consensus-
based analysis approach. Kavanagh has pointed out that
since a court upholding a bill of rights has no interests
of its own to further, it is relatively unaccountable to the
various political interests in society. Furthermore, a
107. For more information on the margin of appreciation, see R.S.J. Macdon-
ald, ‘The Margin of Appreciation’, in R.S.J. Macdonald, F. Matscher &
H. Petzold (eds.), The European System for the Protection of Human
Rights (1993), 83-124; H.C. Yourow, The Margin of Appreciation Doc-
trine in the Dynamics of European Human Rights Jurisprudence (1996);
E. Brems, ‘The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Case-Law of the
European Court of Human Rights’, 56 Zeitschrift für Auslandisches
Öffentliches Recht und Volkrecht 240 (1996); M.R. Hutchinson, The
Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the European Court of Human
Rights, 3 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 638 (1999); S.
Greer, The Margin of Appreciation: Interpretation and Discretion under
the European Convention on Human Rights (2000); G. Letsas, ‘Two
Concepts of the Margin of Appreciation’, in A Theory of Interpretation
of the European Convention on Human Rights (2007), at 80-99; J.
Christoffersen, Fair Balance: Proportionality, Subsidiarity and Primarity
in the ECHR (2009); J. Kratochvil, ‘The Inflation of the Margin of
Appreciation by the European Court of Human Rights’, 29 Netherlands
Human Rights Quarterly 324 (2011); J. Gerards, ‘Pluralism, Deference
and the Margin of Appreciation Doctrine’, 17 European Law Journal 80
(2011); A. Legg, The Margin of Appreciation in International Human
Rights Law: Deference and Proportionality (2012); F. Fabbrini, ‘Margin
of Appreciation and the Principle of Subsidiarity’, in M. Andenas, E.
Bjorge & G. Bianco (eds.), A Future for the Margin of Appreciation?
(2015), iCourts Working Paper Series, No. 15.
108. A wide or broad margin also leads to a low standard of proof, meaning
a lenient scrutiny by the Court of the respondent’s arguments. In fact,
as Ambrus states, the main point of critique with this is that it replaces
the proportionality test in many of the cases dealing with a broad mar-
gin. See M. Ambrus, ‘The European Court of Human Rights and Stand-
ards of Proof. An Evidentiary Approach towards the Margin of Appreci-
ation’, in L. Gruszczynski and W. Werner (eds.), Deference in Interna-
tional Courts and Tribunals: Standard of Review and Margin of Appre-
ciation (2008), at 241.
109. For a parallel approach by the Court in the area of the freedom of reli-
gion, see K. Henrard, ‘How the European Court of Human Rights’ Con-
cern Regarding European Consensus Tempers the Effective Protection
of Freedom of Religion’, 3 Oxford Journal of Law and Religion 398
(2015).
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court is preferred because judges are not directly affec-
ted by their own decision and can therefore provide a
corrective to some of the energies that animate normal
politics, such as those of political interest and power.110
It is also the ECtHR’s (counter-majoritarian) task to
protect rights of minorities under the ECHR;111 apply-
ing the consensus-based analysis to equal marriage
rights does not do justice to this task of the Court.
Second, the use of the term ‘European consensus’ is
vague as it is not always clear how the ECtHR defines it,
nor is the Court consistent in its application.112 Consen-
sus has been based on the existence or non-existence of
common ground in national laws, on practices, on com-
mon social trends or even on ongoing debates in Mem-
ber States.113 This differentiation is prone to manipula-
tion as the answer depends on the question one is ask-
ing.114 Furthermore, European consensus does not
always necessarily mean a clear majority, as it may also
refer to an emerging trend.115 This is confusing in light
of the recent judgments discussed in the previous sec-
tion of this contribution where the ECtHR referred to
the existing number of CoE Member States that have
provided some form of recognition of same-sex relation-
ships (although the ECtHR does not find this enough to
determine an existence of an European consensus), but
also to the emerging global trend of legalisation of same-
sex marriage in various other countries.116 The Court
could have assessed this emerging trend more in terms
of proof of the existence of European consensus instead
of focusing on the lack of legislation on same-sex mar-
riage in certain Member States, especially considering
that such a lack does not always mean that there is oppo-
sition to it; a study by the German Anti-Discrimination
Agency at the beginning of 2017 for instance demon-
strated that 83% of the German population expressed
support for same-sex marriage and that 95% believed in
the legal protection of LGBT rights.117 It therefore was
110. A. Kavanagh, ‘Participation and judicial review: A reply to Jeremy Wal-
dron’, Law and Philosophy 22, 451-86, at 472 (2003).
111. F. Rigaux, ‘La liberté d’expression et ses limites’, 13 Revue trimestrielle
des droits de l'homme 401, at 411 (1995).
112. P. Martens, ‘Perplexity of the national judge faced with the vagaries of
European consensus’, in A. Kovler, V. Zagrebelsky, L. Garlicki, D. Spiel-
mann, R. Jaeger & R. Liddell (eds.), Dialogues between judges (2008)
53, at 58.
113. Helfer, above n. 10, at 134. Also see H. Fenwick, ‘Same-sex Unions at
the Strasbourg Court in a Divided Europe: Driving Forward Reform or
Protecting the Court’s Authority via Consensus Analysis?’, 3 European
Human Rights Law Review, 249-72, at 253 (2016).
114. For more on consensus, please see L. Wildhaber, A. Hjartarson, S. Don-
nelly, ‘No Consensus on Consensus? The Practice of the European
Court of Human Rights’, 33 Human Rights Law Journal 7, 248-63
(2013); M. Ambrus, ‘Comparative law method in the jurisprudence of
the European Court of Human Rights in light of the rule of law’, 2 Eras-
mus Law Review 3, 353-71 (2009); K. Henrard, ‘How the ECtHR’s use
of European Consensus Considerations allows Legitimacy Concerns to
Delimit its Mandate’, in P. Kapotas and V.P. Tzevelekos (eds.), Building
Consensus on European Consensus (to be published in 2018).
115. Fenwick, above n. 113, at 251.
116. See for instance Vallianatos, above n. 39, para. 91, and Oliari, above n.
48, paras. 65, 135 and 178.
117. See <www. dw. com/ en/ germans -not -opposed -to -same -sex -marriage/ a
-37110913> for more information.
not a surprise that the German parliament recently
legalised same-sex marriage.118
Third, by relying on the consensus-based analysis, the
ECtHR shies away from providing clarity119 on the
interpretation and/or application of Article 12, especial-
ly in the context of same-sex couples. In Oliari, the case
was inadmissible under Article 12, while in Chapin and
Charpentier it was admissible. Also, while the ECtHR
keeps on referring to Article 12 as enshrining the tradi-
tional concept of marriage between a man and a woman,
the provision is actually based on Article 16 UDHR.
That latter provision refers to ‘men and women’
(emphasis added) with a view to award women equal
rights,120 not to establish a distinction between differ-
ent-sex couples and same-sex couples; this distinction
was never an issue at the time of drafting of the UDHR.
The travaux préparatoires for instance do not mention
anything on a possible heterosexual nature of the chosen
wording.121 The wording of Article 12 ECHR is actually
quite ambiguous and could be interpreted in different
ways. Even the ECtHR acknowledges that it could be
read so as not to exclude the marriage between persons
of the same sex.122 This would be logical assuming that
the wording was deliberately drafted with the intention
to award women equal rights or to emphasise that only
adults could marry and not children. It is either way
peculiar that the ECtHR to this day refers to the histori-
cal context in which the ECHR was adopted while it has
been almost sixty years since its adoption. Now of
course there is the argument that, at the time of the
ECHR’s drafting, marriage between men and women
was the only option in the minds of the drafters, but that
brings us to the following issue: It is the Court’s own
case law that the Convention is to be considered a living
instrument and that it should be interpreted in the light
of present-day conditions.123 As mentioned previously,
originalism plays a very small role with regard to human
rights treaties.124 Even if Article 12 ECHR was initially
adopted to enshrine the traditional concept of marriage
between a man and a woman, in present-day conditions
the ECtHR could choose for an evolutive or dynamic
interpretation of the provision125 so that same-sex cou-
ples in stable committed relationships are allowed to
marry and enjoy the same legal protection and recogni-
tion as different-sex couples do under that provision.
118. Gesetz zur Einführung des Rechts auf Eheschließung für Personen glei-
chen Geschlechts, 07-07-2017, BT-Drs. 18/66665.
119. F. Hamilton, ‘Why the Margin of Appreciation Is not the Answer to the
Gay Marriage Debate’, 1 European Human Rights Law Review, 47-55
(2013).
120. Waaldijk, above n. 12, at 238. Also see W.A. Schabas (ed.), The Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights – The Travaux Préparatoires
(2013), at 304, 420, 859, 1074, 1154 and 1198-1200.
121. Ibid., Waaldijk, at 238 and Schabas, at 283. The same can be said
about Article 23 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) which contains the right to marry, see 16 December
1966, General Assembly resolution 2200 A.
122. Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, above n. 19, para. 55.
123. E.B. v. France, above n. 71, para. 92 and Christine Goodwin, above n.
31, paras. 74-75.
124. G. Letsas, above n. 107, at 59, and Killander, above n. 54, para. 2.2.
125. Dzehtsiarou, above n. 53, at 1731.
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This is of course easier said than done, but if the
ECtHR would follow such an evolutive interpretation, it
would not only be welcomed by same-sex couples, but
also follow the global trend towards same-sex marriage
that we are seeing in the last sixteen years. The ECtHR
itself acknowledges in its judgments that the institution
of marriage has undergone major social changes since
the adoption of the ECHR and refers to the aforemen-
tioned global attitude and trend towards same-sex mar-
riage. Furthermore, it also emphasises that civil unions
have an intrinsic value and would bring a sense of legiti-
macy to same-sex couples; the same can also be said of
same-sex marriage. The Court even makes a reference
to the ground-breaking judgment of the United States
Supreme Court in Obergefell v. Hodges126 which was
delivered just a month before Oliari legalising same-sex
marriage in all fifty States of the US. Instead, the
ECtHR chooses to hold on to the teleological and heter-
onormative interpretation of the ECHR and justifies its
lack of scrutiny of the justifications and proportionality
requirements put forward by States by referring to the
lack of European consensus.
3.3 Credibility, Authority and Legitimacy of the
ECtHR
Against the aforementioned background, one cannot but
wonder why the Court chooses the particular approach
on the topic of same-sex marriage and equal marriage
rights. It should be emphasised that the ECtHR oper-
ates in the context of international law based on State
sovereignty and that the Court is based on the notion of
subsidiarity.127 Article 1 ECHR places primary respon-
sibility on States Parties to secure fundamental rights
and freedoms to everyone within their jurisdiction and
the judgments of the ECtHR are to be implemented by
those Member States.128 There is already some resist-
ance to the Court’s judgments and a considerable num-
ber of States are seemingly failing to comply with their
duty to ensure the respect of Convention rights and
adhere to the final judgments of the ECtHR.129 It is for
reasons like this that the principle of subsidiarity and
the margin of appreciation are now even going to be
mentioned in the ECHR pursuant to Protocol 15.130
The topic of same-sex marriage raises sensitive moral,
126. Oliari, above no. 48, para. 65 (reference to Obergefell, above n. 82).
127. Fenwick, above n. 113, at 250. For more on subsidiarity and the ECtHR,
see A. Mowbray, ‘Subsidiarity and the European Convention on Human
Rights’, 15 Human Rights Law Review 2, 313-41 (2015), G. Füglistaler,
‘The Principle of Subsidiarity and the Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in
the European Court of Human Rights’ Post-2011 Jurisprudence’, Cahier
de l’IDHEAP 295/2016 Unité Droit public, 2016 IDHEAP, Lausanne,
and A. Follesdal, ‘Subsidiarity and International Human-Rights Courts:
Respecting Self-Governance and Protecting Human Rights-or Neither?’,
79 Law and Contemporary Problems 147, 147-63 (2016).
128. Art. 46(1) ECHR states that The High Contracting Parties undertake to
abide by the final judgment of the Court in any case to which they are
parties. The Committee of Ministers shall supervise the execution of the
judgments (see para. 2 of Art. 46).
129. Report of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, The
effectiveness of the European Convention on Human Rights: the Brigh-
ton Declaration and beyond, 33 AS/Jur (2014), para. 35.
130. Protocol 15 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 24 June 2013, CETS 213.
ethical and/or religious issues, especially for conserva-
tive Member States. If the ECtHR would choose a pro
same-sex marriage stance, it could risk losing its credi-
bility and authority in the eyes of these Member
States.131 Furthermore, steering away from a wide mar-
gin of appreciation into a narrow one for the Member
States could cause some hostility towards implementing
the Court’s judgments.132
The aforementioned are all disadvantages of the
ECtHR’s judicial review. The Court therefore exercises
self-restraint133 and is hesitant in taking a more active
role in encouraging States to facilitate equal marriage
rights. But then again, if the ECtHR continues choosing
this (type of) consensus-based analysis and allowing
Member States a wide margin of appreciation, it could
contribute to a detrimental treatment of minorities, in
this case same-sex couples, with regard to basic rights
and legal protection, which are not always guaranteed by
cohabitation and/or civil unions the way marriage
sometimes does. This way, the ECtHR could risk
undermining its role and legitimacy as the guardian of
the ECHR.134 The Court therefore tries to strike a bal-
ance between upholding the rights of the ECHR while
at the same time trying to maintain and preserve its
authority. The ECtHR could also flex its muscles and
choose a counter-majoritarian approach by interpreting
Article 12 evolutively. An overwhelming majority of
authors share the view that such an interpretation would
not be contrary to international law.135 This counter-
majoritarian approach is not only one of the tasks of a
human rights court and would protect human rights,
but most importantly could even enhance the legitimacy
of the political system as the whole.136 Even the presi-
dent of the ECtHR himself has declared that the ECHR
concept of democracy goes beyond crude majoritarian-
ism, and the ECtHR will, as required, exercise a coun-
131. Fenwick, above n. 113, at 249.
132. The European Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) finds itself
in a comparable situation. LGBT-rights in general and equal marriage
rights especially are sensitive issues which cause the CJEU to tread cau-
tiously as these matters are delicate from the point of view of the EU
Member States. We can see this apprehension in recent cases, such as
Léger (Case 528/13, Geoffrey Léger v. Ministre des Affaires sociales, de
la Santé et des Droits des femmes, Établissement français du sang
[2015], ECLI:EU:C:2015:288) and Parris v. Trinity College Dublin (Case
443/15, David L. Parris v. Trinity College Dublin, Higher Education
Authority, Department of Public Expenditure and Reform, Department
of Education and Skills [2016], ECLI:EU:C:2016:897).
133. M. Marochini, ‘The interpretation of the European Convention on
Human Rights’, 51 Collected Papers of the Faculty of Law in Split 1,
63-84, at 67 (2014).
134. Letsas, above n. 107, at 122-23.
135. Pitea, above n. 52, at 553.
136. R. Fallon, ‘The Core of an Uneasy Case for Judicial Review’, 121 Har-
vard Law Review 1693, 1693-1736, at 1699 (2008). Also see K. Dzeht-
siarou, European Consensus and the legitimacy of the European Court
of Human Rights (2015), at 170-71.
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ter-majoritarian function for the sake of pluralism, toler-
ance and the rights of minorities.137
3.4 The Future of European Consensus in the
Context of Equal Marriage Rights?
In light of the criticisms of the consensus-based analysis
(or actually, this type of consensus-based analysis as I
also refer to Fenwick’s alternative below), it is worth
analysing the potential alternative approaches that could
have been followed by the Court or which are still viable
options for the ECtHR in future cases. The evolutive or
dynamic interpretative method has already been men-
tioned previously in this contribution and for the rea-
sons mentioned there, it is in my eyes one of the most
preferable approaches to equal marriage rights’ situa-
tions. However, if parting completely from a consensus-
based analysis is too big of a step, the ECtHR could also
choose to apply the same analysis in a different way.
Fenwick suggests consensus-based analysis where the
analysis of the consensus is discerned not only in a sin-
gle State, but on broadly comparable States as a signifi-
cant, but not solely determinative aspect of the general
European consensus.138 As Fenwick indicates, placing
some reliance on such a consensus would appear at first
glance to be more likely to slow down the pace of change
in this context than would relying on the general Euro-
pean consensus but, perhaps paradoxically, doing so
might encourage the Court to take a more proactive
approach since any underlying concerns judges might
have as to the reception of their judgments in certain
states might be allayed to an extent.139 The reasoning
behind the argument of regional consensus or regional
customary international law140 is that there is a distinc-
tion between Western European and Central and East-
ern European States in the intensity of trends towards
the consolidating of democracy and of the values of tol-
erance and acceptance of diversity in those States.141
This can also be seen in the fact that (mostly) Western
European States have legalised same-sex marriage and
States that have not or have even changed the definition
of marriage in their Constitution to that being between a
man and a woman are predominantly in Central and
Eastern Europe.142 The disadvantage is that placing
emphasis on this other method of consensus-based anal-
ysis would foster a gradualist approach to eroding dis-
137. See J.P. Costa’s speech ‘The Inks Between Democracy and Human
Rights Under the Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights’,
delivered in Helsinki on 5 June 2008, available at: <http:// . echr. coe. int/
Documents/ Speech_ 20080605_ Costa_ Helsinki_ ENG. pdf>. For more
information on counter-majoritarianism by different courts in favour of
LGBT rights, see S.G. Mezey, Queers in court: Gay rights law and pub-
lic policy (2007), at 7.
138. Fenwick, above n. 113, at 263.
139. Ibid.
140. Killander, above n. 54, para. 2.2.
141. Ibid.
142. Plausible explanation for this East-West division in Europe may be the
role that religion plays in certain States or the economic hardships expe-
rienced by the region’s citizens which cause populist politicians using
anti-gay rhetoric to gain momentum, see ‘The East/West Divide on
LGBT Rights in Europe’, available at: <https:// freedomhouse. org/ blog/
east -west -divide -lgbt -rights -europe> and F. Buhuceanu, ‘Tradition val-
ues, Religion and LGBT Rights in Eastern Europe’, ECP 2014.
crimination (in comparison to the consensus-based anal-
ysis) against same-sex couples in a number of CoE
States. Then again, it could also avoid the perception
that the ECtHR is trying to impose ‘Western’ human
rights’ standards on Central and Eastern Member States
in cases dealing with sensitive moral, ethical and/or reli-
gious issues.143 This method can therefore be consid-
ered more of a middle ground approach.
Another option for the ECtHR in its assessment could
be having an analysis of Article 14 in combination with
Article 8 play a bigger role. These provisions had been
invoked in the Oliari judgment, but the ECtHR found it
unnecessary to analyse Article 14, stating that there had
already been a violation of Article 8. In Schalk and Kopf,
the ECtHR found a relatively similar situation and
emphasised that discrimination based on sexual orienta-
tion requires particularly serious reasons by way of jus-
tification.144 The dissenting judges in that case were of
the opinion that Article 14 should have been applicable
as well. To have Article 14 (in conjunction of Article 8)
play a bigger role could give the ECtHR the opportunity
to elaborate on the types of discrimination of same-sex
couples in Member States, the justifications put forward
and their proportionality, and also on how the European
consensus should be interpreted in (future) situations
involving the application of the provision(s). Consider-
ing the fact that Article 14 (in combination with other
provisions, such as Article 8) has not been assessed in
many same-sex relationship relating cases, chances are
small that the Court would apply a different approach in
the near future, but this option could provide significant
clarity with regard to those situations and perhaps even
offer some legal certainty.
Johnson and Falcetta145 encourage applicants to utilise
Article 3 ECHR (the prohibition of torture, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment) to address discrim-
ination of sexual orientation in the area of marriage.
Because of the open-ended wording of the provision and
its applicability and scope not being circumscribed to
particular areas of social life, Johnson and Falcetta think
the Court could more effectively address discrimination
against sexual minorities by developing Convention
jurisprudence in a more holistically and comprehensive
way and enable a more sociological understanding of
and response to a variety of ways in which discrimina-
tion against sexual minorities is socially organised and
experienced.146 A creative invocation of Article 3 may
143. Fenwick, above n. 113, at 263.
144. Joint dissenting opinion of judges Rozakis, Spielmann & Jebens in
Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, above n. 19, at 8. Also see Hamilton, above
n. 119, at 54-5.
145. P. Johnson and S. Falcetta, ‘Sexual Orientation Discrimination and Arti-
cle 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights: Developing the
Protection of Sexual Minorities’, European Law Review, in print (2018).
146. Ibid., at 5. See for instance X v. Turkey which established a new, strong
framework for holding national authorities to account for sexual orien-
tation discrimination in respect of their positive obligations under Art. 3
in conjunction with Art. 14 ECHR, X v. Turkey, ECHR (2012), No.
24626/09. A similar approach was applied by the Court in Identoba and
Others v. Georgia, ECHR (2015), No. 73235/12, see Johnson and Fal-
cetta, above n. 145, at 21-22.
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lead to be fruitful in the future as Johnson and Falcetta
claim that the close connection between the right to
marry and respect for human dignity has been thor-
oughly explored by courts as well as by scholars.147
It will also be interesting to see if and how Protocol 12148
to the ECHR could play a role in the debate surround-
ing equal marriage rights. The Protocol can be applica-
ble when there is discrimination on grounds of sexual
orientation.149 The idea behind it initially was to broad-
en in a general fashion the field of application of Article
14, containing a non-exhaustive list of discrimination
grounds150 and having an autonomous application, free
of the applicability of the provisions of the ECHR; this
makes it different from Article 14 ECHR, which can
only be applicable in conjunction with one of the other
provisions of the Convention. Of course, the applicabili-
ty of the Protocol does depend on its ratification and as
of 2017, only twenty CoE States have ratified it. Unsur-
prisingly, many States that do not allow same-sex mar-
riage also have not ratified this Protocol, but the amount
of ratifications is steadily growing each year. The mean-
ing of the notion of discrimination both under Article 14
as well as Protocol 12 have been subject to consistent
interpretation by the Court.151 However, in some cases,
the Court seems to extend the ‘ambit’ of Article 14
ECHR very far,152 effectively amounting to bringing
about the implementation of Protocol 12 to the ECHR,
even for those States that had not ratified Protocol 12.153
It is unclear if the Court would ever apply such an
approach to cases dealing with equal marriage rights,
but with the aforementioned cases, the Court certainly
opened up the possibility for it.
Finally, another option is Johnson’s solution of looking
at de facto marriage rights and protection.154 When there
is discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation
between unmarried different-sex couples and unmarried
same-sex couples, Johnson finds that the ECtHR should
undermine the heteronormativity of de facto marriage
law as it did in the cases Karner v. Austria and Kozak v.
147. Johnson and Falcetta, above n. 145, at 34. Also see W.N. Eskridge, The
Case for Same-Sex Marriage: From Sexual Liberty to Civilized Commit-
ment (1996); R. Wintemute, ‘From “Sex Rights” to “Love Rights”:
Partnership Rights as Human Rights’, in N. Bamforth (ed.), Sex Rights:
The Oxford Amnesty Lectures (2005), at 186.
148. Protocol 12 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms on the Prohibition of Discrimination,
4 November 2000, ETS 177.
149. Explanatory Report – ETS 177 – Human Rights (Protocol No. 12), at 5.
150. Ibid., at 3.
151. L.G. Loucaides, ‘The prohibition of discrimination under Protocol 12 of
the European Convention on Human Rights’, in The European Conven-
tion on Human Rights: Collected Essays (2007), at 63.
152. See for instance the concurring opinion of Judge Borrego Borrego in the
case Stec v. United Kingdom, ECHR (2006), Nos. 65731/01 and
65900/01. This extension of the ambit seems to be confirmed in Luczak
v. Poland, ECHR (2007), No. 77782/01.
153. R. O’Connell, ‘Cinderella Comes to the Ball: Article 14 and the Right to
Non-Discrimination in the ECHR’, 29 Legal Studies: The Journal of the
Society of Legal Scholars 211, at 216-17 (2009).
154. P. Johnson, ‘Marriage, heteronormativity, and the European Court of
Human Rights: A reappraisal’, 29 International Journal of Law, 56-77
(2015).
Poland.155 The relevant rights and benefits in those
cases were available to unmarried different-sex couples
and were strongly materially and symbolically attached
to marriage. This was discriminatory as unmarried
same-sex couples did not have the same rights and bene-
fits. Johnson claims that looking at the requirement of
whether the couple (same-sex or different-sex) is living
as if it was ‘in a marriage’ or in a ‘de facto marital cohabi-
tation’, contributes to disrupting the heteronormativity
of marriage itself.156 According to Johnson, by regarding
same-sex and different-sex couples as analogous in
respect of de facto marriage, the judgments disturbed
the ‘sacredness’ of (heterosexual) marriage and repre-
sent a basis from which to evolve future ECtHR juris-
prudence in respect of same-sex marriage.157 I agree
with Johnson and think this approach will put the
emphasis on the de facto situation of couples instead of
on their sexuality or gender, which will also take away
the problem of couples not being ‘relevantly similar,’;158
a requirement that is needed for an issue to arise under
Article 14 ECHR and which has caused the provision
not to be assessed in many same-sex relationship relat-
ing cases as the Court found the situations of same-sex
couples not being relevantly similar to that of different-
sex couples. This approach might lead to Article 14 pos-
sibly being applicable more often in situations dealing
with equal marriage rights.
Whichever way, approach or method the ECtHR choo-
ses, its jurisprudence has the power to change State
practice. We saw this after the Vallianatos case in
Greece and the Oliari case in Italy; as a result of the two
judgments, both Greece and Italy changed their laws
and allowed same-sex couples to conclude civil
unions.159 The fact that these States effectively needed
to change and in fact did change their legislation shows
that the ECtHR’s case law can act as a catalyst for
change. Of course, there is some circularity in this situa-
tion, but a more progressive Court could lead to more
Member States providing same-sex relationships with
legal protection and recognition in the form of civil
unions, but also same-sex marriage. That development
is then taken into consideration by the ECtHR when
assessing the question whether there is European con-
sensus on the matter or not or even the fact whether
there is an emerging trend in the legislation of Member
States on the matter of same-sex marriage or same-sex
relationships in general. In other words, the ECtHR has
a hand in shaping this consensus if it so wishes. The fact
that there is currently hardly any evolution to be seen in
the views of the ECtHR concerning equal marriage
155. Karner v. Austria, ECHR (2003), No. 40016/98 and Kozak v. Poland,
ECHR (2010), No. 13102/02.
156. Johnson, above n. 154, at 58.
157. Ibid.
158. See para. 2.2.1 of this contribution where this issue has been mentioned
previously.
159. See ‘Italy Approves Same-Sex Civil Unions’, available at: <https:// www.
nytimes. com/ 2016/ 05/ 12/ world/ europe/ italy -gay -same -sex -unions.
html> and ‘Greece ends discrimination of gay people in civil union law’,
<https:// euobserver. com/ lgbti/ 131660>.
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rights does not mean that this has to stay that way in the
(near) future.
4 Conclusion
We have seen that the ECtHR often chooses a hetero-
normative approach to the concept of marriage whenev-
er Article 8 or 12 ECHR are invoked in the context of
same-sex relationships; the Court often refers to the his-
torical context in which the Convention was adopted
and states that same-sex couples have no right to marry
under the ECHR. We are also seeing an emerging global
trend of more and more countries around the world,
predominantly in Western and Northern Europe, that
are legalising same-sex marriage. Even so, there are cur-
rently only fourteen CoE Member States that allow
same-sex marriage (sixteen, if you count Malta and Ger-
many, whose marriage equality laws will come into force
soon), hence the ECtHR has thus far concluded, as it
did in the recent cases Hämäläinen, Oliari and Others,
and Chapin and Charpentier on equal marriage rights,
that there is no European consensus on this matter.
With the choice of this type of consensus-based analysis,
the ECtHR offers States a margin of appreciation to
make rules on granting same-sex couples access to mar-
riage or not. This margin is also wide if the topic con-
cerns a sensitive moral, ethical and/or religious issue,
which is the case with same-sex marriage. This contri-
bution argued that the current (type of) consensus-
based analysis by the ECtHR may prove to be problem-
atic for several reasons and may lead to problems such as
the detrimental treatment of minorities by the majority
in different Member States. The ECtHR tries to strike a
balance between, on the one hand, protecting minorities
such as same-sex couples, and on the other hand main-
taining its own credibility and authority towards Mem-
ber States that might not agree to promoting rights and
providing legal protection to same-sex couples. The
contribution has also highlighted different solutions to
this problem. The ECtHR can, for instance, choose an
evolutive approach or alternatively, apply consensus-
based analysis in a different way (focusing on broadly
comparable States), look at the possible application of
Article 14 (in conjunction with Article 8 ECHR), apply
Article 3 in a more creative, holistic and comprehensive
way or possibly assess couples on their de facto mar-
riage-situation instead of their gender and sexual orien-
tation.
It is to be seen what the ECtHR will do in the next few
years when faced with new cases dealing with equal
marriage rights. The situation will become particularly
interesting when half (or more) of the CoE Member
States will have legalised same-sex marriage. In Oliari
the ECtHR stated that civil unions have an intrinsic val-
ue and would bring a sense of legitimacy to same-sex
couples. The same can be said for same-sex couples and
marriage. With its statement in Schalk and Kopf that
Article 12 ECHR could be read so as not to exclude the
marriage between persons of the same sex, the ECtHR
offered an opening that can be used in the future to
interpret Article 12 and the right to marry and found a
family as including persons of the same-sex. We have
seen that the ECtHR has a hand in shaping the interpre-
tation of European consensus if it so wishes and with its
case law it can also influence State practice. After offer-
ing a narrow opening in Schalk and Kopf, now it is up to
the Court to allow future same-sex applicants to benefit
from this opportunity and someday enjoy full equal
marriage rights.
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